

سهنتهرى لىكۆلىنوهى ناپندهپى  
مركز الدراسات المستقبلية  
Center for Future Studies



# Future Readings

No.12- April, 2026

## Political Deadlock in the Kurdistan Region: Options and Implications

Sulaymaniyah

April, 2026

**Center for Future Studies**

## **Future Readings**

No. (12) - April, 2026



---

# **Political Deadlock in the Kurdistan Region: Options and Consequences**

### **Researchers:**

Dr. Yousif Goran

Dr. Abid Khalid Rasool

Dr. Faruq Abdul Mawlood

Dr. Jalil Omer Ali

---

Address: Centre for Future Studies – Sulaimani – Iraqi Kurdistan Region

Tel: +964 (0) 773 836 3758 - +964 (0) 751 833 9135

---

#### **Email address:**

[www.centerfs.org](http://www.centerfs.org)

Facebook: Center.of.Future.Studies

Instagram: centerfs

Twitter: center\_fs

Email: [info@center.org](mailto:info@center.org)

# Table of Contents

## Section One

- ◇ Constitutional interpretation of options to exit the political deadlock in Kurdistan Region.....| 2

## Section Two

- ◇ The Federal Government and dealing with the political deadlock in Kurdistan Region.....| 5

## Section Three

- ◇ Political deadlock and the "Two Administrations" option in Kurdistan Region.....| 9

## Introduction

Since the sixth round of the Kurdistan Parliamentary Elections (held on 20 October 2024), the President of the Kurdistan Region’s invitation for parliament to convene (on 24 November 2024), and the holding of the first parliamentary session (on 2 December 2024)—which has remained open to this day—the Kurdistan Region has been mired in a deep political and constitutional deadlock. This impasse stems from the failure of the principal winning forces of that election to reach a consensus on forming a new government cabinet, compounded by a pervasive disregard for partnership and balance in governance.

To overcome this crisis and break out of the current deadlock, several options may be identified, each carrying distinct consequences and outcomes: completing the government formation process through a negotiated agreement between the KDP and PUK; dissolving the Kurdistan Parliament and holding early elections; referring the matter to the Federal Supreme Court for resolution; or, as a last resort, legally restructuring the Region’s governance according to the “Two Administrations” system that prevailed prior to 2005. Several of these options bear grave consequences for the future integrity of the Kurdistan Region as a political entity.

*Future Readings*, No. 12, analyzes and examines the available options for resolving the political deadlock in the Kurdistan Region across three sections, shedding light on the consequences and challenges of this political crisis in the wake of the 2024 parliamentary elections.

## Section One; Constitutional Interpretation of Options to Exit the Political Deadlock in the Region

**The first option**, completing the process of forming the new KRG government, is legally and constitutionally the most natural way to exit the existing political deadlock. Clearly, the necessary legal and constitutional steps to complete this process—following the call of Kurdistan Region’s President for assembly (24/11/2024) and the first session chaired by the eldest member (2/12/2024)—consist of:

- **First:** Electing the Parliamentary Presidency (the Speaker, the deputy and the secretary of parliament) in the same first session via secret ballot and an absolute majority, per Article 48 of the Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Law No. (1) of 1992, as amended.
- **Second:** Electing the President of the Kurdistan Region via open ballot and an absolute majority of Parliament members, per Article 4 of the Law for Reactivating the Institution of the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region No. (1) of 2019.
- **Third:** Forming the new government cabinet, which passes through three stages: the stage of naming a person for Prime Minister by an absolute majority of Parliament; the stage of that person being tasked by the KRI President to form the Council of Ministers within 30 days; and the stage of granting confidence to the ministerial structure by an absolute majority, per Items 3 & 4 of Article 56 of the Election Law, and Item 12 of Article 10 of the Presidency Law No. (1) of 2005, as amended.

Naturally, since no single list was able to win an absolute majority of parliamentary seats in the 2024 election results, both of the main parties and their allies hold the same power and significance in terms of their number of seats, it is necessary for all three steps mentioned above to be carried out through **consensus** between the main winning forces. This requires political will and trust, especially to overcome political stubbornness and the monopolization of all major pillars of power. Until this situation is rectified and a balance is created, any further disruption of the process may be interpreted constitutionally as a failure to adhere to the rule of law and the non-fulfillment of a constitutional duty.

**The second option**, which is the dissolution of Parliament and resorting to early elections, is a forced constitutional solution used when parties fail to form a government. Legally (per Item 4 of Article 10 of the Presidency Law), the dissolution of Parliament occurs in these cases:

1. If more than half of the members resign.
2. If a legal quorum for a meeting is not achieved within 45 days of the call for a session.
3. If Parliament fails to grant confidence to three different ministerial structures consecutively.
4. If the election system changes while 6 months or less remain in the term.

After dissolution, the President announces general elections (early elections) within 15 days via decree, provided the election date does not exceed 60 days after dissolution. Currently, per the Federal Supreme Court decision (30/5/2023), the supervision of the Region's elections falls to Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission. Certainly, the previous cabinet will continue as a 'caretaker government,' just as it is now. The weakness of this option is that, besides high financial and political costs, there is no guarantee that the political map will change enough to solve the crisis. It might return the Region to the same cycle of deadlock and increase mistrust, especially if the goal of early elections is further unilateralism through illegitimate measures to achieve unpredictable changes in results.

**The third option**, which may be pursued if the previous two options fail or are bypassed—is to resort to the Federal Supreme Court to resolve the situation (pursuant to Article 93 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which grants this court broad powers to oversee the constitutionality of laws, interpret texts, and settle disputes between authorities at the federal, regional, and provincial levels). For this option, the creation of a political deadlock and the failure to form a government for an extended period could be framed as a 'negligence in fulfilling constitutional duties' or a 'violation of the principle of popular sovereignty and the transfer of power.' These could serve as justifications to bring the case before the Court, whether initiated by a federal institution (such as the President of the Republic, who serves as the

protector of the Constitution) or by a regional party that has been harmed by this negligence and violation. Although the Court's decisions are final and binding, in practice, it cannot directly compel the regional parties to adopt a specific course of action. At most, the Court's ruling would lean toward setting a mandatory timeframe for the region's political forces to restart the government formation process, or potentially even dissolving the regional parliament due to its paralysis. Furthermore, this option would once again shift the resolution of the region's internal crises from the hands of the region itself to the federal authorities—whose decisions have frequently exhibited a centralist tendency. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the Federal Court— in order to exert more pressure on the parties— could rule that the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) decisions are illegal and prohibit it from taking strategic steps or issuing strategic decrees.

**The fourth option** is restructuring governance **according to a dual-administration system within the framework of a single region**, mirroring the *de facto* situation that existed between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah during the years (1996–2005). Although this option may be viewed with concern and seen as a regression, from a legal and constitutional perspective, this step falls entirely within the scope of the Kurdistan Region's internal affairs and its freedom to organize its powers (pursuant to Articles 116 to 121 of the Iraqi Federal Constitution). In this context, based on the framework of 'broad decentralization' referenced in Article 122 of that Constitution, the Region could be reorganized into two broad autonomous zones, each possessing its own governance institutions, financial resources, and security forces within the territorial integrity of the Region. Furthermore, 'dual autonomous zone' models serve as other templates for this administrative restructuring. Although certain aspects of this option might not be desirable to any political force, the persistence of policies of marginalization and administrative injustice—alongside the imposition of a *de facto* partisan two-administrations—may render this option an unavoidable alternative for those harmed by these dangerous policies.

## **Section Two: The Federal Government and Dealing with the Political Deadlock in the Region**

The delay in forming the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) following the October 2024 parliamentary elections has created legal, economic, and political crises for the Region. It has extended the tenure of the “expired” caretaker government to record levels, resulting in its decisions, directives, and actions carrying less legitimacy and weight—particularly at the federal level. This is because the federal government is committed to dealing with an elected government that possesses popular legitimacy, especially since the federal center provided the budget and logistics for the elections and approved their results.

Although the federal government has repeatedly warned of this political deadlock and urged political parties—specifically the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—to intensify efforts to overcome this crisis, these pressures and efforts remain fruitless. On several occasions, the federal government has described this situation as an intentional obstacle designed to prevent dialogue and the resolution of outstanding issues. It has pointed to the existence of significant partisan and personal interests within the expired KRG cabinet that hinder the resolution of these problems. Despite the concerns of the federal government and the international community regarding the persistence and prolongation of the political deadlock in the Region following the 2024 elections, some view this situation as an opportunity for the federal government. This situation could potentially bring about a fundamental shift in the nature of the relationship between the Kurdistan Region and the federal government, such that their mutual dealings are no longer based on the Constitution. Instead, it could evolve into a systematic exploitation by the federal government—in the absence of legitimate institutions in the Region—to establish a new reality that further restricts the Region’s legal, political, and constitutional autonomy.

The delay in forming the government for more than a year and a half will not remain confined to the context of an internal crisis; rather, it will create a significant gap that the federal government can

exploit. Through the Federal Supreme Court and constitutional and legal standards, the federal government could further bind the Region, centralize its internal crises, and transfer its political issues and affairs from the Region's hands to the federal authorities. This would greatly support centralism and the restructuring of the federal system if the federal government chooses to invest in it, leading to two potential consequences that can be highlighted here.

### **First: Intervention and Increased Marginalization of the Region**

If the federal government views the current deadlock in the Region—resulting from the failure to form the Kurdistan Regional Government—as an opportunity to end the era of unified Kurdish positions and institutional legitimacy vis-à-vis the federal government, then politically, the persistence of this issue grants Baghdad a greater chance to no longer view Erbil as a unified decision-making center. Instead, it would deal with the Region's expired government as an unavoidable option, failing to observe the balance of mutual interests in the negotiation and decision-making processes, particularly regarding critical issues with financial, security, and political dimensions. Furthermore, this deep internal division within the Region following the 2024 elections—primarily caused by a lack of trust, partnership, and balance, as well as the monopolization of power—has weakened the Kurds' weight as a 'decisive balancer' in the Iraqi political process. While the Regional Government may have previously imposed its own conditions and positions on certain federal cases and matters, or maintained a lower level of compliance with all federal government decisions, the situation has now reversed. The Kurdistan Region has transformed from a powerful constitutional partner into an entity merely managing and getting by on daily affairs according to the will of Baghdad."

The most dangerous consequence of this political deadlock is the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) loss of control over vital portfolios, particularly the energy sector. During this period, the federal government has succeeded in exploiting the Region's flawed energy policies, the governance vacuum, and judicial pressure to impose the authority of the 'SOMO' company over the Region's oil. It

has relegated the role of the Region's Ministry of Natural Resources to a secondary administrative role, which has led to the gradual hand-over of the management of oil fields and companies to the federal government. In the customs tariff portfolio as well, the federal government has increased its pressure on the Region to submit to the 'Customs Unification' system and the control of border crossings. By implementing this system, it has restricted the KRG's authority regarding customs policy.

### **Second: The Weakening of International Pressure on the Federal Government**

The Kurdistan Region has historically derived its international strength from being a model of stability and democracy in a troubled region, leading the international community to treat it as a quasi-state entity. However, the failure to form a government within record time and the bypassing of all constitutional deadlines has sent a negative signal to world capitals and international organizations. They may begin to view the Region's institutions as "illegitimate" or "expired," weakening their willingness to defend the Region's constitutional rights against federal hegemony.

The prolongation of this deadlock causes diplomatic missions to deal with the Region as a *de facto* reality rather than a constitutional entity. The federal government may exploit this international retreat to signal to the world that Baghdad is the sole legitimate and supreme representative for managing the affairs of citizens in Kurdistan. This paves the way for a stage where international recognition of the Region's unique political status might end, transforming it in the eyes of the world into a purely internal Iraqi matter managed by federal authority.

In conclusion, while the federal government has encouraged Kurdish parties to expedite government formation, there is a risk that this situation will move beyond "mediation" to the actual erosion of political gains made after 2003. By seizing economic and security files and undermining the Region's international legitimacy, the foundation for a highly centralized Iraq is strengthened. This reality leaves Kurdish political forces with two choices:

1. End the deadlock based on genuine partnership and terminate the monopolization of key power structures to protect what remains of the constitutional entity.
2. Continue internal conflict and political stubbornness, the result of which will be the transformation of the Region into a “soulless” administrative entity entirely under the hegemony and will of the federal government.

### Section Three: Political Deadlock and the “Two Administrations” Option in the Region

Presenting the “Two Administrations” option as a solution to the political deadlock in the Kurdistan Region is an attempt to transition beyond the *de facto* partisan dualism that has currently fractured the pillars of governance. It stems from the perspective that this fragmentation has paralyzed the foundation of consensus and the mechanisms of political partnership within the Region’s decision-making centers, eroding trust between its constituent powers. Furthermore, it has produced a governing style where areas under the dominant party’s influence in the capital (Erbil and Duhok) benefit from economic growth and quality public services, while outlying areas (Sulaymaniyah and Halabja) are deprived of such development.

Consequently, the aim of presenting a legal—rather than partisan—two administrations, known in constitutional law as “Regional Political Decentralization,” is twofold: first, to end systemic injustice and marginalization; and second, to prevent further fragmentation and potential violent conflict while protecting local interests within the framework of the Region’s general interest. This option, as presented here, can be interpreted as a legal form of managing pluralism, political diversity, and regional autonomy.

The aspiration to keep Kurdistan Region unified following the 1991 uprising was the bedrock for establishing the first Parliament and Regional Government in 1992. However, the conflict between the KDP and PUK over power and revenue, exacerbated by foreign intervention and historical mistrust, led to the 1994 civil war and the 1996 division of the Region into two *de facto* administrations. Following the 1998 Washington Agreement, the 2003 fall of the Ba’ath regime, and the solidification of the Region’s status in the 2004 and 2005 Iraqi Constitutions, the KRG was formally reunified. Yet, in practice, a “Partisan Dual Administration” persists across three primary dimensions:

- 1. Administrative:** The division of decision-making authority between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah based on party influence.

- 2. Security:** The continued existence of the 70 and 80 Forces and se-

curity apparatuses outside of unified national control.

**3. Economic:** Ongoing conflict over oil and gas revenues and border crossings, which are tied to the interests of regional and international powers.

During the ninth cabinet of the KRG, this partisan dualism weakened the remaining links of that fragile formal union. This has resulted in a situation where one power utilizes the legal capacity to collect revenue and government ministerial institutions in the capital to serve its own sphere of influence and gather votes, while the other power's areas suffer from stagnation and service shortages. This environment has caused the KRG and its capital to lose the trust of all areas within the Region, deepening the partisan divide.

In any case, continuing this dual administration in its current partisan form is constitutionally illegal and endangers the Region's very existence. Therefore, this situation must be placed within a structured legal framework to end the inequality and marginalization between different areas. This legal restructuring can be formulated through three distinct models:

• **Model I:**

Under this model, the Kurdistan Region remains intact as a single entity. However, through a new law or an amendment to Provincial Council Law No. 3 of 2009, the provinces (Sulaymaniyah and Halabja) would be organized into an administrative zone broader than a province. Similarly, Erbil and Duhok could be organized into a corresponding zone. Each zone would possess independent administrative, financial, and security self-governing powers without needing to refer back to the capital. In this scenario, the KRG becomes a coordinating body overseeing only general policy-making and foreign relations.

• **Model II:**

This model consists of establishing a system of two autonomous zones within the framework of the Kurdistan Region, while designating Erbil, the capital, as a third autonomous city—distinct and independent of either of the two autonomous zones. This arrangement could be regulated by a law issued by the Kurdistan Parliament. Accordingly, each autonomous zone would have its own parliament

and council of ministers to manage its internal affairs, while the high national affairs of the Kurdistan Region (such as diplomatic missions and Kurdish representation in Baghdad) would be managed through the Kurdistan Region's parliament and government in the capital. In conclusion, the concept of two-administrations can be interpreted as a mechanism for managing conflict and political diversity within the Kurdistan Region and can be granted scientific legitimacy. What is dangerous is the unorganized, extra-legal, and partisan form of two-administrations. Transforming this illegal reality into a legal system—whether through broad decentralization or two autonomous zones, along with establishing Erbil as an independent administrative zone—would end the injustice and marginalization that exists between the various areas of the Kurdistan Region.

## Conclusion

Forming a government through political consensus based on balance, partnership, and administrative justice is the most suitable and healthy legal path to end the political deadlock and preserve stability. The difficulty of this process lies solely in the lack of political will and trust, which remains absent among the political parties.

As for dissolving parliament or calling early elections, beyond being a lengthy and costly process, there is no guarantee it would significantly shift the political map or resolve the crisis. Regarding a resort to the Federal Supreme Court, it remains a high-risk option; it invites federal interference in the Region's internal affairs, risks the "centralization" of regional issues, and encourages Baghdad to no longer view Erbil as a unified center of decision-making. The least desirable option is a return to a dual administration, which remains a forced exit for each party to serve its own citizens and prevent the further deepening of conflicts.

## سەنتەرى لىكۆلىنەۋەى ئاينىدەى

### سەنتەرىكى تويۇنەۋەى زانستى ناھكومىيە دامەزراۋە بۇ سوۋدى گشتى

#### نامانجەكانى سەنتەر:

۱. پالېشتىكىردنى پىرۆسەى لىكۆلىنەۋەى زانستى و ھاندانى پىسپۆر و لىكۆلەران بۇ ئەنجامدانى لىكۆلىنەۋەى و بەدواداچوون بۇ ئەو بابەتانەى بايەخدان بۇ پىسپۆرىيەكانى ئاينەدەزانى ستراتىژى و سىياسەتى گشتى و دەرەكى.
۲. بەشدارىكىردن لە پىشكەۋتن و بەرەۋىپىدانى فەلسەفەى لىكۆلىنەۋەى زانستى لە ھەرئى كوردستاندا.
۳. پىشكەشكىردنى راۋىژى زانستى و شارەزايى لىكۆلىنەۋەى بە دەزگا ھكومىيەكانى ھەرئىم.
۴. پىشكەشكىردنى راۋىژى زانستى و شارەزايى لىكۆلىنەۋەى بە كەرتى تايبەت و دەزگا ناھكومىيەكانى ھەرئىم.
۵. بەشدارىكىردن لە بەرەۋىپىدانى پىرۆگرامى خويىندن لە بوارەكانى پەيوەندىدار بە پىسپۆرىيەكانى سەنتەر.
۶. ئەنجامدانى كۆنفرانس و سىمىنارى زانستى بۇ پىشتىۋانىكىردنى پىرۆسەى تويۇنەۋەى زانستى.
۷. ھەماھەنگىكىردن لەگەل سەنتەرە ھكومى و ناھكومىيەكانى لىكۆلىنەۋەى زانستى لە ناوخۇ و دەرەۋەى ھەرئى كوردستان و ناوخۇ و دەرەۋەى عىراق لە پىناۋ گواستەۋەى و ئالوگۆپكىردنى بىرۋا و شارەزايى زانستى.
۸. بەدواداچوون و پىۋانەكىردنى ئاراستەكانى راى گشتى بۇ ئەو بابەتانەى چىگەى بايەخى ھاۋۋلاتيانن.
۹. راھىنان و پىگەياندىنى تويۇر لە بوارى پىسپۆرىيەكانى سەنتەردا.
۱۰. كاركىردن لەسەر ئەو پىرس و دۆزە ستراتىژىيەنى كە تائىستا لە كوردستاندا بە شىۋەيەكى زانستى و بەپى پىۋەرە ئەكادىمىيەكان كاربان لەسەر نەكراۋە.

#### چالاكىيەكانى سەنتەر:

۱. نووسىن و ئەنجامدانى لىكۆلىنەۋەى زانستى و پۇلەسى پەيپەر و كىتب و بلاۋكىردنەۋەيان.
۲. ئەنجامدانى كۆنفرانس و كۆنگرەى زانستى و كۆر و سىمىنار.
۳. دەركىردنى گۆقارئىكى ئەكادىمى مەھكەم و متمانەپىداراۋ و ھەردوۋ ۋەرزنامەى ئاينەدەناسى و ئىرانناسى.
۴. ئەنجامدانى چاۋپىكەۋتن و بەرنامەى مىدىيائى.
۵. ۋەرگىرپانى كىتب و جۆرنال و بلاۋكىردنەۋەى سەرچاۋەى بىيانى پەيوەندىدار بە پىسپۆرىيەكانى سەنتەر.
۶. سوۋدوۋەرگىرن لە ھۆكارەكانى راگەياندىن بە گشتى و ئەنجامدانى راپىرسى بۇ ئاراستەكانى راى گشتى.
۷. كۆكىردنەۋەى داتا و زانىارى لەسەر كايەكانى سىياسەتى گشتى لە ھەرئى كوردستان و شىكىردنەۋەى و بلاۋكىردنەۋەيان.

## حول: مركز الدراسات المستقبلية

مركز غير حكومي تأسس لإجراء دراسات علمية بغرض تحقيق المصلحة العامة.

### أهداف المركز:

١. دعم عملية البحث العلمي وتشجيع المختصين والباحثين لأجراء البحوث في المجالات المتعلقة بالدراسات المستقبلية والسياسة العامة والاستراتيجية والشؤون الخارجية.
٢. المساهمة في انماء فلسفة البحث العلمي وتطويرها في اقليم كردستان.
٣. تقديم استشارات علمية والخبرة البحثية للمؤسسات الحكومية في اقليم كردستان.
٤. تقديم استشارات علمية والخبرة البحثية للقطاع الخاص والمؤسسات غير الحكومية في اقليم كردستان.
٥. المساهمة في تطوير المناهج الدراسية في المجالات المتعلقة باختصاصات المركز.
٦. تنظيم مؤتمرات وندوات علمية لدعم عملية البحث العلمي وتعزيزها.
٧. التنسيق مع المراكز الحكومية وغير الحكومية المعنية بالبحث العلمي داخل اقليم كردستان وخارجه، بهدف تبادل الخبرات العلمية معها.
٨. متابعة إتجاهات الرأي العام وقياسها حول القضايا التي تجذب اهتمام المواطنين وتؤثر في مصالحهم.
٩. اعداد الباحثين وتأهيلهم في المجالات التي تختص بها المركز.
١٠. العمل على دراسة القضايا الاستراتيجية في اقليم كردستان التي لم تدرس وفق المعايير العلمية.

### نشاطات المركز:

١. اجراء البحث العلمي و نشره.
٢. تنظيم المؤتمرات والندوات العلمية.
٣. نشر الكتب و الدراسات العلمية المتعلقة باختصاصات المركز.
٤. اصدار مجلة علمية محكمة.
٥. التواصل مع قنوات الاعلام المعنية باهتمامات المركز واجراء الاستفتاءات العلمية لقياس اتجاهات الرأي العام.
٦. ترجمة الكتب و الدراسات العلمية الاجنبية المتعلقة باختصاص المركز ونشرها.
٧. رصد المعلومات والبيانات في جميع مجالات السياسة العامة في اقليم كردستان وتحليلها ونشرها.

## **Centre for Future Studies (CFS)**

### **A Non-Governmental Centre for Academic Research in the Public Interest.**

#### **Aims and objectives:**

- 1.To promote expertise and support research activities in the fields of politics and international relations, with a particular focus on the future of strategy and public and foreign policies.
- 2.To contribute to the development and enhancement of the philosophy of scientific research in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- 3.To provide the governing institutions of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with professional and expert advice.
- 4.To provide the private sector and non-governmental organizations operating in Iraqi Kurdistan with professional and expert advice.
- 5.To contribute to the enhancement of curricula in the fields of the centre's expertise.
- 6.To hold scientific conferences and seminars on current and future domestic and international political and strategic issues.
- 7.To coordinate with governmental and non-governmental research centres inside and outside Iraqi Kurdistan, with the aim of exchanging ideas and expertise.
- 8.To monitor and assess the directions of, and trends in, public opinion in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly on issues crucial to the stability and prosperity of the region.
- 9.To train and qualify researchers in the centre's areas of expertise.
- 10.To address the region's strategic issues that have not yet been examined from an academic and scientific standpoint.

#### **Activities:**

- 1.To conduct and publish scientific research.
- 2.To hold regular conferences, seminars, and talks on current and future domestic, regional, and international political and security issues.
- 3.In addition to policy papers, analytical reports, and books, the centre publishes a scientific journal primarily concerned with the future of domestic, regional, and international strategic and security issues.
- 4.To conduct interviews and engage with public and private media.
- 5.To translate and publish books and journal articles from English and other foreign languages into Arabic and Kurdish, on topics within the centre's areas of expertise.
- 6.To conduct opinion polls on various domestic political issues in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- 7.To gather data and publish analyses on various issues related to public policy in Iraqi Kurdistan.

سهنتهری لیکۆئینهوهی نایندیهی  
مركز الدراسات المستقبلية  
Center for Future Studies



# Future Readings

No.12- April, 2026

## Political Deadlock in the Kurdistan Region: Options and Implications

Sulaymaniyah  
April. 2026



سەنتەری لیکۆلینەوهی نایندهیی  
مرکز الدراسات المستقبلية  
Center for Future Studies

پانانی نایندهیی ژماره (١٢)  
بنهستی سیاسی له ههریمی کوردستان؛ بژاردهو لیکهوتەکان

قرات مستقبلية رقم (١٢)  
الانسداد السياسي في إقليم كوردستان؛ الخيارات والتداعيات

[www.centerfs.org](http://www.centerfs.org)

2026