

سهنتهرى لىكؤلىنهوهى نائندهى
مركز الدراسات المستقبلية
Center for Future Studies



Future Readings

No.11- March, 2026

Iraq Amidst the U.S. Israel vs. Iran War

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Iraq Amidst the U.S.-Israel vs. Iran War

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Introduction

The conflict between the U.S.-Israel axis and Iran represents an existential challenge for the Iraqi state. It places the country in a precarious position, caught between its ideological and political commitments to regional causes and the necessity of safeguarding its national sovereignty. Iraq is directly impacted by this war through the involvement of armed groups under the doctrine of the “Axis of Resistance” and the concept of “Unity of the Fronts” (Unity of Arenas). Furthermore, the loss of airspace sovereignty—which has turned Iraq into a theater for airstrikes by the warring parties—poses a dangerous threat to the fragile security stability that the government is struggling to fortify.

Economically, Iraq remains a hostage to oil price fluctuations and the mechanisms of its export to global markets. Looking ahead, national budget deficits and the threat of total economic collapse are the Iraqi government’s primary fears. Furthermore, Iraq’s geopolitical position has forced it into a delicate transition: it wavers between the desire to play the role of regional mediator and the risk of becoming a battlefield for proxy conflicts. In this environment, both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region require a sophisticated diplomatic balance to prevent the country from sliding into an all-out war—a scenario that could return the nation to “square one” of systemic violence.

Future Readings No. 11 examines and analyzes Iraq’s position and status within the context of the war between the (U.S.-Israel) and Iran across four primary themes. Specifically, it presents the perspectives and approaches of all three warring parties regarding their dealings with Iraq.

Section One; Iraq's Situation on the Eve of War: Developments and Repercussions

There is no doubt that the repercussions of the current war between the (U.S.–Israel) and Iran will—more than any other country or region—have a major impact on Iraq's strategic and military standing, as well as the future of the country's political and security landscape.

From a strategic standpoint, the sequence of events starting from October 7th and its subsequent repercussions—the Gaza War, the weakening of Lebanese Hezbollah, the fall of Assad in Syria, the 12-day war against Iran in June 2025, and the current U.S.–Israel war against Iran, —all indicate that the Middle East is currently facing a massive geostructural transformation. Therefore, this current conflict is expected to be more than just another round in the cycle of confrontation between the (U.S.–Israel) and (Iran and its affiliates). Instead, it appears to be a redesign of the power map across many regional countries, with Iraq at the very center. Historically, due to its geographic location and its political and sectarian composition, Iraq has always served as a primary arena for settling these international conflicts.

From the perspective of the general political situation, for more than two decades, Iraqi policy has been designed to reflect a constant balance between the interests of Iran and the United States. Currently, one of the most anticipated outcomes of this war is the collapse of this balance. Such a disruption would confront Iraq with two grueling tests:

First: The potential end of the forced neutrality that Iraq has maintained between the conflicting sides until now. This scenario suggests that Iraq will no longer be able to “walk the tightrope” of neutrality. Pressures on the Baghdad government are expected to intensify, forcing it to take a clear stance between the two axes and finally commit its allegiance to one side over the other.

Second: The escalation of internal divisions within Iraq. On one hand, this manifest between the country's primary components—specifically among Sunnis, Kurds, and a segment of moderate Shiites who

do not wish for Iraq to become a party to this war by aligning with either side of the conflict. On the other hand, divisions are widening within the factions of these components themselves, particularly within the "Shiite House." Some Iraqi armed groups view themselves as an integral part of the "Axis of Resistance." All of these factors could ultimately lead to a major rupture between the official state institutions and various non-state actors (unofficial forces).

From the perspective of the political process, the outbreak of this war coincided with the steps to form a new government and appoint a new Prime Minister, following the results of the Council of Representatives elections held last November. This suggests that the trajectory of the war will be heavily reflected in the equations of forming Iraq's future government. In the short term, the process of government formation may reach a deadlock until the outcome of the war is settled. However, in the long term, the war's results are expected to act as a primary "filter" for selecting Iraq's next Prime Minister. For this scenario, at least two possibilities are anticipated.

First: A scenario where the war ends in a way that Iraq is not officially forced to take a side. In this case, Iraqi political forces might manage to settle on a new Prime Minister who can, to some extent, sustain the "forced neutrality" mentioned previously. Of course, the task of such a government would be extremely difficult. On one hand, the United States would demand guarantees that Iraq will not be used as a platform by armed groups to strike its interests or allies. On the other hand, Iran would expect Iraq not to slide into the orbit of U.S. policy or become an obstacle to Iran's regional hegemony and its affiliated groups within Iraq. Therefore, in this situation, the more the next Prime Minister is a figure with "independent decision-making power," the less they will be forced to become a satellite of any regional axis or international superpower. Otherwise, Iraq will inevitably drift toward favoring one side of the conflict over the other.

Second: The potential for a total weakening of the Iranian regime following the war and a retreat of its regional hegemony. In such a scenario, political forces close to Tehran—specifically certain factions within the Coordination Framework—would see their ability to

maneuver diminish. This environment could open a window of opportunity for a “technocratic” or “nationalist” figure capable of securing the trust of the United States and Iran’s regional rivals. In these circumstances, it is likely that (Maliki) would withdraw his aspirations to return as Prime Minister, potentially clearing the path for (Sudani) or another candidate to run. Ultimately, if this war ends with a power shift in favor of the United States, Washington’s conditions for the future Iraqi government will become far more stringent. In that case, Washington would only support a Prime Minister who provides serious guarantees to control armed groups, protect U.S. interests and military bases, and decouple the Iraqi financial system from benefiting Iran.

Regarding the future of the armed groups, which remains one of the most sensitive issues in current Iraqi politics—particularly since factions close to Iran under the “Resistance” umbrella consider themselves an inseparable part of Iran’s defense strategy. According to their own statements, they have launched numerous missile and drone attacks against U.S. bases and interests, directly involving themselves in this war. Consequently, they have become direct targets for Israel and the United States. In the near future, the targeting of these groups’ leaders—similar to the operations against Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon—may intensify, potentially paralyzing their direct communication with the Resistance decision-making centers in Iran. This would likely lead to the weakening of their military and financial capabilities. If the lines of communication and support from Tehran are eventually severed, these groups will face chaos and confusion. While some may attempt to adapt to official Iraqi state policy to ensure their survival, it is highly probable that the hardline ideological groups will pivot toward guerrilla warfare, instigating disorder and destabilizing Iraq’s internal security.

In sum, the impacts of this war on Iraq will not be limited to strategic, political, and security dimensions; they will also encompass the economic sphere. Currently, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has already created significant obstacles for Iraqi oil exports—the nation’s primary revenue source and economic lifeblood. Furthermore,

should Iraq fail to distance itself from Iran's sphere of influence, or if pro-Tehran groups escalate further out of control against the U.S., Washington may use the U.S. Dollar as a lever of pressure against the Iraqi government. It is also possible that, in a state of further escalation, the U.S. could impose severe financial sanctions on Iraqi banks. Such a move would lead to an economic collapse, ultimately paralyzing the capabilities of whatever government happens to be in power at that time.

Section Two: Israel and Iraq: Redesigning the Region and Shifting the Balance of Power

In the war between (U.S.-Israel) and (Iran), the objectives of the United States and Israel may be closely aligned; however, their strategic visions and perspectives are certainly not identical. Their common ground regarding Iraq consists of several strategies, which we will detail below:

Common interests;

1. For both sides, Iraq must be part of the Arab world's sphere and drawn into the military, security, and economic alliances that will emerge from the formation of new regional blocs in the future.
2. Iraq is a constituent part of the American security framework, which dictates that it must not pose a threat to the security of regional alliances. The Iraq-U.S. security agreement serves as a long-term strategic framework that guarantees a lasting friendship.
3. Iraq is part of the regional power shift zone; if not the very epicenter of these transformations, then it must not be an obstacle for Israel and U.S. and their regional interests.

Points of Divergence:

1. Israel's criteria and standards for the future balance of power in the region differ from those of the United States. Israel views any force as an adversary if it possesses not only the capacity to threaten them but even the mere capability to defend itself. The Americans, however, do not share this perspective.
2. Israel views Iraq as a geographical and ideological extension of Iran, perceiving the existence of Shiite power in Iraq as an inherent threat. In contrast, the Americans maintain a more nuanced view of the Shiite political landscape in Iraq. For instance, the United States does not reject every Prime Ministerial candidate proposed by the Coordination Framework; rather, they specifically oppose those candidates they believe are backed by Iran or who may be unwilling to dismantle the Iranian-aligned armed groups.
3. Israel's perception of the concept of 'peace' mirrors that of the Iranians; both believe that absolute peace is inextricably linked to se-

curity beyond their own borders. The United States, however, maintains a different perspective. Israel views Iraq through a singular lens: that Israeli stability and peace can only be achieved when Iraq is not governed by forces that share the same [adversarial] doctrines of peace and security.

4. The American perspective regarding the passage—or prevention—of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Law was that this force must not exist outside the structure of the Iraqi Army. They opposed the PMF having an independent budget, training, or economic status as a parallel force within Iraq. Consequently, the U.S. demand was for these forces to be integrated into the Iraqi Army, to take orders directly from the Prime Minister, and to ensure their supreme authority and loyalty remain exclusively Iraqi. Conversely, Israel treated the PMF as a direct proxy of Iran. Therefore, it maintained that integrating them into the Iraqi Army would only exacerbate the problem, as the leaders of this force would exploit American and coalition military and advisory capabilities to benefit Israel's adversaries. Furthermore, Israel believed that integration would effectively mean granting official recognition to Iranian proxies. Consequently, the Israeli proposal was that this force should either be completely disbanded from its foundations or entirely neutralized.

In sum, we can assert that the conflict between the (U.S.-Israel) and (Iran) should not be viewed merely as a minor or localized engagement. Rather, it is a regional war whose scope and dimensions are expanding day by day. Ultimately, one might interpret the conclusion of the conflict in Iran as the end of all associated wars; however, in reality, the objective of this war is the complete redesign of the region and a shift in the balance of power. Therefore, even if it concludes in Iran, the struggle will persist in other territories, leading to a redrawing of the political map and a realignment of forces. This equation applies perfectly to Iraq, where the repercussions and outcomes are already becoming apparent. This is precisely the objective Israel seeks in Iraq and is actively working

Section Three: U.S. and Iraq: Neutrality and Disengagement Versus Economic Security

The direct military escalations between Washington and Tel Aviv on one side, and Tehran on the other, have once again placed Iraq at the very core of America's strategic equations. Given that Iraq is situated in the heart of the conflict, the Iraqi government is attempting to de-escalate tensions through diplomacy. However, American pressure—exerted through threats of financial sanctions and military force—coupled with Iranian pressure—exerted through armed groups—have made Iraqi neutrality virtually impossible.

Washington no longer views Iraq merely as a traditional security partner; instead, it sees the country as an inevitable strategic geography that could serve as a vital and influential corridor in this conflict—either to contain Iranian hegemony or to inadvertently strengthen it. Consequently, the United States approaches Iraq based on the dual principle of 'Preventing Collapse and Preventing Hegemony' simultaneously. This entails preserving the stability of the Iraqi state on one hand, while preventing Iraq from falling completely under Iran's strategic umbrella on the other.

This established Washington doctrine is tied to the complexity of Iraq's political structure, where multiple power centers—such as the federal government, armed groups, and local components—are intertwined. This reality has forced Washington to adopt a dual-track policy: supporting official state institutions while simultaneously employing leverage to limit the hegemony of armed groups and prevent them from dominating the state's political and sovereign decision-making. Their influence has grown significantly following the recent Iraqi parliamentary elections, with a clear inclination toward Iranian alignment and a visible impact on determining the nature of future governments.

What has further complicated the situation for Iraq is that the current government is a caretaker administration. The primary drawback of a caretaker government is the emergence of a 'power vacuum,' in which the state's capacity for sovereign decision-making and its control over armed groups are severely limited. This has significantly weakened the official stance of the Iraqi state in mitigating the re-

percussions of the war and meeting U.S. demands.

U.S. Objectives in Iraq

In the lead-up to this conflict, the Trump administration is seeking to achieve four complementary objectives within the Iraqi arena. These are:

1- Disruption and isolation of the “unity of the arenas” and exerting pressure on the Iraqi government to prevent armed groups from using Iraqi territory as a platform to launch missiles and drones toward Israel or American bases within Iraq and the Gulf countries.

2- Securing aerial movement and protecting Iraqi airspace as an effective corridor for American and Israeli warplanes to conduct attacks deep within Iranian territory, as according to some statistics, at least 18 to 24 warplanes pass through Iraqi airspace daily.

3- Protecting energy security and preventing the cessation of Iraqi oil exports as a guarantee for global markets, especially with continuous Iranian threats against the Strait of Hormuz and the rise of oil prices to over \$100 per barrel; in this situation, the United States fears the escalation of concerns among European and Southeast Asian countries that obtain a large portion of their energy needs from Iraq and the Gulf countries.

4- Eliminating positions and safe havens and preventing leaders of the IRGC from using Iraq as a strategic depth or a second war front to manage their military operations, especially after the intense attacks by both the United States and Israel against the high military command center of the IRGC in Tehran and other cities.

U.S. options and scenarios in Iraq on the eve of war

To isolate and distance Iraq from the Israel-U.S. and Iran war, or to prevent the “unification of fronts,” U.S. policy toward Iraq is positioned between several options:

First: In this stage, the U.S. will continue to support the Iraqi government to strengthen its sovereignty over its airspace and borders, while providing security guarantees in exchange for limiting the activities of armed groups. The U.S. goal is to prevent Iraq from sliding into becoming a “second front” in the war and to maintain it as a buffer zone that prevents Iran from using its territory as a missile

base or a logistical corridor to Lebanon and beyond its borders.

Second: In the event that the Iraqi government loses control over decision-making, Washington may move toward strengthening its presence in the Kurdistan Region and western Iraq as semi-independent security strongholds. This option aims to create protected zones of influence capable of monitoring and rapid intervention without getting embroiled in widespread conflict, especially within major cities.

Third: Systematically targeting the economic and military infrastructure of political and armed groups within Iraq that are close to Iran, and turning the country into an arena to end Tehran's influence entirely. Washington is currently avoiding this option because it jeopardizes the integrity of the state; however, it remains an option if U.S. bases, interests, or Iraq's economic and oil infrastructure face major attacks by groups close to Tehran. Therefore, the U.S. seeks to maintain a level of stability in Iraq that secures oil routes and encourages the de-escalation of tensions and the protection of sensitive facilities from armed group attacks.

Fourth: Economic and monetary pressure. The U.S. Federal Reserve remains the most effective tool for controlling Iraqi liquidity. Washington uses restrictions on currency transfers to ensure that funds do not reach networks associated with Iran.

In conclusion, relations between the United States and Iraq on the eve of the (U.S.-Israel) and (Iran) war after March 2026 are no longer a matter of voluntary cooperation; rather, they have become a process of managing successive crises under the shadow of this ongoing conflict. Iraq fears an economic collapse if the U.S. Federal Reserve translates its concerns into action, while the United States fears losing Iraq as its primary foothold in the Middle East. Therefore, in such a situation, both Iraq as a state and the United States as a primary party in the war desire for Iraq to remain in a "gray zone." However, maintaining this position is contingent upon how well Iraq can protect foreign embassies and American interests domestically; in exchange, it would receive economic assurances to prevent the collapse of its political system.

Section Four: Iran and Iraq: The Unity of Arenas and the Axis of Resistance

Iran's current bet and priority is based on stopping the war and ensuring the survival of its regime. To achieve this, it needs to employ several strategic cards that it has long viewed as its strategic depth, having worked on them for decades in anticipation of days like these:

Among them is Iraq; sometimes as a Gulf country to be embroiled, and other times as a necessary partner to assist in several issues. According to Iranian thinking, Iraq and the Iraqis can play these roles in the heat of war:

1- Iraqi Geography and Groups as Part of the "Unity of Fronts": In this context, the Iraqi arena (Central and South), similar to Lebanon and other locations, could be used to launch attacks against U.S. and Israeli interests, their allies, and their strategic positions. This thesis was developed as a strategy under the name "Unity of Fronts" during the era of the second leader (Khamenei I). Following the aftermath of October 7, Tehran's allies activated these fronts in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria to serve Iranian interests and support Hamas. One week before the February 28 war, Ali Khamenei emphasized that if this war breaks out, Iran will not be the only battlefield; clearly, he meant Iraq as one of those fields. So far, during the war, several Iraqi resistance groups have remained loyal to that strategic legacy. In his first message, Khamenei II—maintaining this same strategy—reiterated his thanks and called for the Iraqi Shia resistance to continue, signaling that Iraq remains a secondary theater in the strategy of war management.

2- Iran's Expectations of the Iraqi Government:

First: Regarding the position of the interim government, Tehran believes it must maintain a "positive" neutrality in its favor. This means, at the very least, that Iraq should not align with the U.S., but rather support Tehran's allies, protect its borders for them, and refuse to open its strategic sites to the Americans and Israelis. Iran has been successful in this regard because the cabinet's composition is partly made up of those very allied groups, reflecting a situation where

the fingerprint of Iranian policy is clearly visible. However, this has placed the Prime Minister and his cabinet in an embarrassing and difficult position; while he tries to appear as neither pro-Iranian nor pro-American, the reality is the opposite. Both sides have targeted Iraq, and its sovereignty, territory, and sites have been impacted throughout the war, just as Tehran and Tel Aviv have. Regarding the current issue of forming Iraq's future government, Iran remains adamant: either the government should not be formed and its establishment delayed, or it must be a government that does not deviate from the orbit of Tehran's influence and policies, with a composition that meets its approval. While Iran has not yet been able to form such a government, it has successfully paralyzed the formation process to ensure the opposite outcome does not occur.

Second: Regarding the energy issue, Tehran—as part of its strategy to force Washington to stop the war—resorted to closing the Strait of Hormuz to drive up energy prices and compel exporting countries to halt production. It has seen some success in this regard, pushing global energy prices into the triple digits. Consequently, Iraq is one of the countries that both exports energy through the Gulf (excluding the Kurdistan Region) and is a major producer; furthermore, Tehran holds influence over the Iraqi cabinet, making it easier to achieve its goals there than in other countries. Whether by necessity or by choice, this has led to a halt in oil exports from southern Iraq. To appease the United States, Iraq considered and reached an agreement to export via the Kurdistan Region's pipelines. However, like other Iraqi positions, this is a double-edged sword: the volume sent through the Region is much smaller than what is exported via the Gulf, and it faces significant security risks. Nevertheless, this allows Sudani to partially fulfill Tehran's objectives while simultaneously demonstrating to the U.S. that he has not intentionally stopped the oil flow, thereby attempting to satisfy both sides.

Third: Regarding the Kurdistan Region, Iran's perspective is that the Region must secure its most dangerous border to ensure that no war front is opened from the eastern flank (Western Iran). It expects that neither the Iranian Kurdish opposition nor the Region's bases be used

to serve US and Israeli interests. To date, the Region has remained committed to this neutrality. However, in the actual conduct of the war, this commitment by the Kurdistan Region has not been respected; instead, the Kurdish arena has been treated no differently than the Gulf or Tel Aviv. The cities and areas of the Kurdistan Region have been targeted more than three hundred times. In fact, the casualties of these attacks on the Region are higher than those of the U.S., even though the U.S. is a primary combatant and the Region is not officially at war!

Therefore, Iran has generally organized its vision and expectations in Iraq across four levels:

First: Central and Southern Iraq are considered part of the “Unity of Fronts” and must assist Tehran in the war.

Second: Regarding the escalation of energy prices, Iran has practically made Iraq a part of its war strategy by halting its oil exports. This has contributed to the rise in energy prices as an Iranian tactic to pressure and embarrass the United States before American and global public opinion, forcing them to demand an end to the war due to the high cost of energy.

Third: While it is true that Iran has not succeeded in forming a government entirely loyal to its interests, it has so far prevented the formation of a national or pro-American government.

Fourth: Regarding the Kurdistan Region, Iran has practically viewed its territory as part of the arena of its adversaries and enemies, launching daily attacks against it. In terms of positioning, Iran has benefited from the stance of the Eastern (Iranian) Kurdish parties—who have been mindful of the Region’s stability—as well as the neutrality of the land, the parties, and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Consequently, from the gateway of Eastern Kurdistan, the borders have not been part of an open war for Iran.

However, throughout all of this, due to the imbalance of the war, the exhaustion and heavy losses faced by the Tehran government, and the continued American and Israeli attacks, all of Iran’s measures

and actions in Iraq may prove ineffective. While Tehran has worked on these as a long-term strategy, in the (not so distant) future, they may dwindle into mere tactics and become obsolete. With the intensification of attacks against it, these elements—including Iraq’s land and people—will no longer provide the same strategic balance for Tehran. It is not unlikely that, as a result of this situation, Tehran could lose its grip on the field and its political control. Instead of serving as part of Tehran’s strategic depth, Iraq could turn against its policies or, at the very least, return to being an ordinary neighbor free from its hegemony.

Conclusion:

With the outbreak of the war between the (US-Israel) and (Iran) in late February 2026, Iraq became a primary battlefield. Under the shadow of this conflict, Iraq stands at a historical turning point. On the international level, just as the US-Israeli conflict against Iran might end the era in which Iraq served as a gray zone and a theater for proxy struggles, this war could also permanently push Iraq toward sliding into one of the conflicting sides.

The U.S. continues to support the Iraqi government, as it does not want the country to collapse or become an overt partisan of one side in the war. Simultaneously, Washington is attempting to restrain all armed groups that support Tehran and wage proxy wars against US and Israeli interests in the region. As for Israel—despite sharing common ground with the US—it views Iraq as an extension of Iranian ideology and reach; it sees the existence of Shia authority in Iraq as a threat and demands the total dissolution of all these armed forces and groups. What matters to the Iranians is that Iraq remains a “second front” and that armed groups continue targeting US and Israeli interests in Iraq and the region. Iran wants the Iraqi government to maintain a “positive” neutrality in Tehran’s favor and not cooperate or align with the US in any way.

On the Iraqi domestic level, the further prolongation of the war may complicate relations between Iraq’s main components (Sunnis, Kurds, and Shias), as well as the factions within those components (the Shia House). The future of forming a new government and appointing the next Prime Minister depends on how well Iraq can distance itself from axis-based politics and establish its position as a sovereign state.

The strategy of the Kurdistan Region in these conflicts, in addition to remaining neutral, has been officially declared from the start: it does not support the war option and believes that opening diplomatic channels is the best way to spare the region further destruction. In this regard, the Region has clearly informed the U.S., Iran, and even the Iraqi government that it is not and will not be a part of these conflicts; it will not allow its territory to become a battlefield or a source of threat to any party. It is vital for the Kurdistan Region to continue this strategy as a factor of peace and security in the area, taking into account the preservation of the interests of the conflicting parties without distinction.

سەنتەرى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى ئاينىدەى

سەنتەرىكى تويۇنەۋەى زانستى ناھكومىيە دامەزراۋە بۇ سوۋدى گشتى

نامانجەكانى سەنتەر:

۱. پالېشتىكىردنى پىرۇسەى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى زانستى و ھاندانى پىسپۇر و لىكۆلئەران بۇ ئەنجامدانى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى و بەدواداچوون بۇ ئەو بابەتانەى بايەخدان بۇ پىسپۇرىيەكانى ئاينەدەزانى ستراتىژى و سىياسەتى گشتى و دەرەكى.
۲. بەشدارىكىردن لە پىشكەۋتن و بەرەۋىپىدانى فەلسەفەى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى زانستى لە ھەرئى كوردستاندا.
۳. پىشكەشكىردنى راۋىژى زانستى و شارەزايى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى بە دەزگا ھكومىيەكانى ھەرئىم.
۴. پىشكەشكىردنى راۋىژى زانستى و شارەزايى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى بە كەرتى تايبەت و دەزگا ناھكومىيەكانى ھەرئىم.
۵. بەشدارىكىردن لە بەرەۋىپىدانى پىرۇگرامى خويۇندن لە بوارەكانى پەيوەندىدار بە پىسپۇرىيەكانى سەنتەر.
۶. ئەنجامدانى كۆنفرانس و سىمىنارى زانستى بۇ پىشتىۋانىكىردنى پىرۇسەى تويۇنەۋەى زانستى.
۷. ھەماھەنگىكىردن لەگەل سەنتەرە ھكومى و ناھكومىيەكانى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى زانستى لە ناوخۇ و دەرەۋەى ھەرئى كوردستان و ناوخۇ و دەرەۋەى عىراق لە پىناۋ گواستەۋەى و ئالوگۇرۇكىردنى بىرۋا و شارەزايى زانستى.
۸. بەدواداچوون و پىۋانەكىردنى ئاراستەكانى راى گشتى بۇ ئەو بابەتانەى چىگەى بايەخى ھاۋۋلاتيانن.
۹. راھىنان و پىگەياندىنى تويۇر لە بوارى پىسپۇرىيەكانى سەنتەردا.
۱۰. كاركىردن لەسەر ئەو پرس و دۆزە ستراتىژىيانەى كە تائىستا لە كوردستاندا بە شىۋەيەكى زانستى و بەپى پىۋەرە ئەكادىمىيەكان كاربان لەسەر نەكراۋە.

چالاكىيەكانى سەنتەر:

۱. نووسىن و ئەنجامدانى لىكۆلئىنەۋەى زانستى و پۇلەسى پەيپەر و كىتىب و بلاۋكىردنەۋەيان.
۲. ئەنجامدانى كۆنفرانس و كۆنگرەى زانستى و كۆر و سىمىنار.
۳. دەركىردنى گۇقارۋىكى ئەكادىمى مەھكەم و متمانەپىداراۋ و ھەردوۋ ۋەرزنامەى ئاينەدەناسى و ئىرانناسى.
۴. ئەنجامدانى چاۋپىكەۋتن و بەرنامەى مىدىياى.
۵. ۋەرگىرۋانى كىتىب و جۇرنال و بلاۋكىردنەۋەى سەرچاۋەى بىانى پەيوەندىدار بە پىسپۇرىيەكانى سەنتەر.
۶. سوۋدوۋەرگىرن لە ھۆكارەكانى راگەياندىن بە گشتى و ئەنجامدانى راپرسى بۇ ئاراستەكانى راى گشتى.
۷. كۆكىردنەۋەى داتا و زانىارى لەسەر كايەكانى سىياسەتى گشتى لە ھەرئى كوردستان و شىكىردنەۋەى و بلاۋكىردنەۋەيان.

حول: مركز الدراسات المستقبلية

مركز غير حكومي تأسس لإجراء دراسات علمية بغرض تحقيق المصلحة العامة.

أهداف المركز:

١. دعم عملية البحث العلمي وتشجيع المختصين والباحثين لأجراء البحوث في المجالات المتعلقة بالدراسات المستقبلية والسياسة العامة والاستراتيجية والشؤون الخارجية.
٢. المساهمة في انماء فلسفة البحث العلمي وتطويرها في اقليم كردستان.
٣. تقديم استشارات علمية والخبرة البحثية للمؤسسات الحكومية في اقليم كردستان.
٤. تقديم استشارات علمية والخبرة البحثية للقطاع الخاص والمؤسسات غير الحكومية في اقليم كردستان.
٥. المساهمة في تطوير المناهج الدراسية في المجالات المتعلقة باختصاصات المركز.
٦. تنظيم مؤتمرات وندوات علمية لدعم عملية البحث العلمي وتعزيزها.
٧. التنسيق مع المراكز الحكومية وغير الحكومية المعنية بالبحث العلمي داخل اقليم كردستان وخارجه، بهدف تبادل الخبرات العلمية معها.
٨. متابعة اتجاهات الرأي العام وقياسها حول القضايا التي تجذب اهتمام المواطنين وتؤثر في مصالحهم.
٩. اعداد الباحثين وتأهيلهم في المجالات التي تختص بها المركز.
١٠. العمل على دراسة القضايا الاستراتيجية في اقليم كردستان التي لم تدرس وفق المعايير العلمية.

نشاطات المركز:

١. اجراء البحث العلمي و نشره.
٢. تنظيم المؤتمرات والندوات العلمية.
٣. نشر الكتب و الدراسات العلمية المتعلقة باختصاصات المركز.
٤. اصدار مجلة علمية محكمة.
٥. التواصل مع قنوات الاعلام المعنية باهتمامات المركز واجراء الاستفتاءات العلمية لقياس اتجاهات الرأي العام.
٦. ترجمة الكتب و الدراسات العلمية الاجنبية المتعلقة باختصاص المركز ونشرها.
٧. رصد المعلومات والبيانات في جميع مجالات السياسة العامة في اقليم كردستان وتحليلها ونشرها.

Centre for Future Studies (CFS)

A Non-Governmental Centre for Academic Research in the Public Interest.

Aims and objectives:

- 1.To promote expertise and support research activities in the fields of politics and international relations, with a particular focus on the future of strategy and public and foreign policies.
- 2.To contribute to the development and enhancement of the philosophy of scientific research in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- 3.To provide the governing institutions of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with professional and expert advice.
- 4.To provide the private sector and non-governmental organizations operating in Iraqi Kurdistan with professional and expert advice.
- 5.To contribute to the enhancement of curricula in the fields of the centre's expertise.
- 6.To hold scientific conferences and seminars on current and future domestic and international political and strategic issues.
- 7.To coordinate with governmental and non-governmental research centres inside and outside Iraqi Kurdistan, with the aim of exchanging ideas and expertise.
- 8.To monitor and assess the directions of, and trends in, public opinion in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly on issues crucial to the stability and prosperity of the region.
- 9.To train and qualify researchers in the centre's areas of expertise.
- 10.To address the region's strategic issues that have not yet been examined from an academic and scientific standpoint.

Activities:

- 1.To conduct and publish scientific research.
- 2.To hold regular conferences, seminars, and talks on current and future domestic, regional, and international political and security issues.
- 3.In addition to policy papers, analytical reports, and books, the centre publishes a scientific journal primarily concerned with the future of domestic, regional, and international strategic and security issues.
- 4.To conduct interviews and engage with public and private media.
- 5.To translate and publish books and journal articles from English and other foreign languages into Arabic and Kurdish, on topics within the centre's areas of expertise.
- 6.To conduct opinion polls on various domestic political issues in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- 7.To gather data and publish analyses on various issues related to public policy in Iraqi Kurdistan.



Future Readings of the Center for Future Studies

Center for Future Studies

<p> Future Reading No.1</p> <p>The Future of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region Amid Current Tensions Origins, Protocols, Governmental Formation, Possible Creation of a Semi-Region and its Treaty Withdrawal</p> <p>February 2020 www.cenestf.org</p>	<p> Future Reading No.2</p> <p>The Intractable Issues of the Kurdistan Region and the Future for its reform Governance and Health Security, Confessions and Internal Democracy in Political Parties</p> <p>March 2020 www.cenestf.org</p>	<p> Future Reading No.3</p> <p>Impossible Conflicts in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region Shi'a and Formation of the Government, Secularization, the Fate of ISIS Processes</p> <p>April 2020 www.cenestf.org</p>	<p> Future Reading No.4</p> <p>Iraqi New Government & the Economic Crisis in Kurdistan Region Contributors and Coauthors</p> <p>May 2020 www.cenestf.org</p>
<p> Future Reading No.5</p> <p>The Future of Dialogues and Agreements Tology of Erbil - Baghdad - Washington The Opportunities and Constraints</p> <p>Sulaimania June 2020 www.cenestf.org</p>	<p> Future Reading No.6</p> <p>The Impact of Regional Polarizations on Iraq and the Kurdistan Region; Turkish Intervention, the Iran-China agreement</p> <p>Sulaimania July 2020 www.cenestf.org</p>	<p> Future Reading No.7</p> <p>The Future of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq amid Internal and External Challenges: Problems in politics, the economy, education and higher education</p> <p>Sulaimania August 2020</p>	<p> Future Reading No.8</p> <p>The Future of Erbil-Baghdad Relations; an Unstable Polarization Background, Mutual Action, Extension and Regimeless</p> <p>Sulaimania January 2021 www.cenestf.org</p>
<p> Future Reading No.9</p> <p>The Biden Era ... America's new Cabinet Policy in the Middle East; And its Consequences on Iraq and Kurdistan</p> <p>Researchers: Dr. Husein Ghanem, Dr. Ahmad F. Fathi, Dr. Ahmad A. Boud, Dr. Ahmad M. Waha</p> <p>Sulaimania February 2021 www.cenestf.org</p>	<p> Future Reading No.10</p> <p>The future of the Formation of the New Government in the Spinal of Iraqi Conflicts Shiite-Sunni-Kurdish house conflicts; International & regional influence</p> <p>Researchers: Dr. Husein Ghanem, Dr. Ahmad F. Fathi, Dr. Ahmad A. Boud, Dr. Ahmad M. Waha</p> <p>Sulaimania April 2022 www.cenestf.org</p>		



سهنتري ليكولينهوهي نايندهيي
مركز الدراسات المستقبلية
Center for Future Studies

راناني نايندهيي ژماره (II)
عراق لهجهنگي نيوان (نهمريكا - نيسرائيل) و (نييران) دا
قرات مستقبلية رقم (II)
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